Militaries across Europe are downsizing and some are eliminating conscription in favor of all-volunteer forces (AVF). The transition is often bumpy and at times has been opposed by the military leadership. For example, in France, President
Chirac surprised the military when he announced an end to conscription in 1996.
Military leaders objected; conscription, they argued, was the only way to get computer programmers and language specialists. 1 Otherwise they would face the costly alternative of paying competitive wages or finding other ways to make military service attractive to such skilled individuals.
Despite greater use of voluntarism across the continent, most European countries still plan to retain conscription. Germany has cut the number of conscripts, but has no plans to move to a completely volunteer military. All of the Scandinavian countries plan to retain conscription, as well as the Central and Eastern European countries (see Table 2 ).
Why are some countries in Europe abandoning conscription while others plan to retain it? The end of the Cold War and the increasing sophistication of weapons systems are often cited as reasons for eliminating conscription. 2 Although geopolitical and technological factors may be important contributors to the termination of the draft in more European countries, the disparity between those countries eliminating conscription and those retaining it cannot be accounted for by those factors because they affect all of Europe.
The disparity also cannot be explained by differences in national wealth between those states retaining and those eliminating conscription. Some analysts have noted that conscription is generally inversely correlated with national wealth and living standards. 1 Yet, this is not a complete explanation; some of Europe's wealthiest and poorest countries plan to retain conscription. 2 These explanations fall short because they attempt to find a general cause of the changing pattern of conscription in Europe. But each country is unique in many respects, responding to its place in the current international environment and the constraints of its political system. The economic arguments for ending conscription and the predictions of those who advocated the AVF in the United
States were largely proven correct. 3 Yet the question of when and how to end conscription and move to an AVF is ultimately a political decision that reflects both international and domestic political factors, as well as domestic economic and operational military considerations.
Despite the complexity inherent in such factors, there are some broad patterns in Europe. We will describe current developments there and then briefly examine the reasons why several European countries have recently decided to end conscription in favor of an all-volunteer force, and compare those countries with those that plan to retain conscription. That discussion will give some indication of what we might expect to see in the near future.
Adopting All-Volunteer Forces Although the end of the Cold War allowed most European countries to drastically downsize their militaries, there are two broad exceptions. First, some countries stood outside of the Cold War alliance system and built militaries to deter threats without outside assistance. These militaries resemble the Swiss militia-type of military and are less subject to the political pressures that drove governments to end conscription elsewhere in Europe. 5 Second, some Central and Eastern European countries are new entities still attempting to construct viable armed forces. Rather than downsizing, these states are increasing the overall size of their active duty forces. 6 While conscription is more likely to be phased out in downsizing militaries, it is more likely to remain a feature of those militaries increasing their active duty forces, and of militia-based militaries.
Four of those countries-Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland-were not allied through the Cold War. They did not share NATO's collective security guarantee, and their consequent need for self-defense drove the structure of their militaries. In effect, those countries have a militia system and share some similarities. All males from teens to middle age are conceivably part of the armed forces. After conscription, initial military service and training is generally brief.
Reserve duty follows and refresher courses are required throughout every male citizen's life. The size of the reserves in those countries reflects this system (see Table 3 ). In Switzerland for example, virtually the entire military is composed of reserves: the ratio of active duty to reserves is 1:13. By comparison, the average ratio of active duty to reserves across Europe is 1:4. 7 But the average for the other three European neutral countries is 1:10, which places them close to the Swiss model. This militia-like system has probably eliminated some of the pressures to end conscription felt elsewhere in Europe. There is no pressing need to dramatically downsize the already small active duty force, and virtually all male citizens spend some time on active duty and remain in the reserves well into middle-age.
Yet, these militia-based militaries are also undergoing a process of restructuring to focus on peacekeeping and similar deployments rather than territorial defense. As they do so there is less need for conscription. In Sweden,
for example, of a youth cohort of roughly 53,000 nearly 25% are rejected for military service, up from 8% in 1979. 8 Sweden conscripted 30,000 men in 1990, but only 15,000 in 2000. 9 There is no indication that Sweden will phase out conscription anytime in the near future, but conscription has become a topic of political debate as only one in five young Swedes are actually conscripted. 10 The increasingly small percentage of the youth cohort taken into the military indicates the declining utility of the practice, and the inherent inequalities of non-universal conscription may eventually lead to popular pressure to eliminate the draft.
Conscription in NATO
Although the long-standing emphasis on self-defense explains the persistence of conscription in the unaligned countries, it does not account for those NATO members that retain conscription: Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, and Turkey. For each there is a different story.
In Germany, an independent commission created by the Schroder government (the Weizsacher commission) recommended cutting the number of conscripts from 130,000 to 30,000 out of an active duty force of 240,000. The
German government has chosen a somewhat smaller reduction in the active duty force and plans to cut the number of conscripts to 80,000.
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The commission never considered abolishing conscription and proposals for a selective draft were ruled out as well. 12 Although the reasons for doing so were ostensibly strategic, we cannot ignore that more than half of the 300,000 draftees in 1997 chose to perform alternative, nonmilitary service such as hospital workers. For Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, NATO's newest members, the challenge of creating a NATO-compatible military necessitates a massive restructuring and downsizing of their armed forces. 15 Each is cutting the size of its active duty force to as little as 50% of its pre-1990 size, and increasing the number of professional soldiers, especially noncommissioned officers. These states are already reducing the term of conscription from two years to less than one year. Hungarian conscripts, for example, serve for just nine months and the government would like reduce it to a six month term. 16 While there are no plans to do so in the immediate future, these states may abandon conscription altogether as their militaries reach the restructuring goals. The preceding pages surveyed this trend and described its current status.
But what is perhaps more interesting than the facts of this trend is the recent public policy debate and public discussion that have accompanied these facts.
Those European countries continuing to use conscription have cited its In other words, the current debate about conscription in Europe seems far less rich, informed, and contentious than the similar debate in the U.S. during the 1960s. The almost cavalier way France ended conscription perhaps best illustrates this point. Arguably, France (Napoleon) invented modern conscription.
Yet the decision to end conscription in France was made after little discussion or debate. 21 Another observation is that the effects on the Some European constitutions, those of Austria, Greece, and Norway, for example, also specify that citizens are "bound", "obligated" or "liable" to serve in the military. 5 As opposed to the United States's constitution which puts a premium on individual liberty, European constitutions spell out benefits that citizens can expect from the state, and in return, what citizens are required to do for the state. That these "requirements" are extracted from citizens in a discriminatory fashion and that the implicit tax conscription that it represents is an especially regressive one does not seem to bother governments supposedly founded on the principles of egalitarianism and income redistribution.
Another issue largely absent from the debate in Europe is economic efficiency. The concept that conscription is an inefficient means of raising a military does not appear to concern European governments. Much has been written from this perspective on the American case, and those arguments were important in persuading some skeptics to support professionalization of U.S. forces in the 1970s. 6 The European parliaments currently looking at the same issue seem remarkably untouched by concerns over the economic efficiency of conscription. conscripts' lengths of service are so short in most countries (see Table 2 ). It is difficult to imagine a period of service of often much less than 18 months serving any useful military purpose. As a result, conscripts are often relegated to serving in low-skill occupations (e.g., cooks or other housekeeping jobs) where inexperience and lack of training is not the disadvantage it might be in technical and combatrelated military occupations. But it is exactly these internal contradictions and the need for capable, professional units that NATO membership requires that may eventually force most European countries to end conscription. It is not difficult to imagine a future where the only European countries that continue to use conscription are those with militia-style systems, where conscription might be more efficient than voluntarism and where conscription's inequities are either absent or not obvious. 
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